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Abstract. In this paper, we discuss an approach to system requirements 
engineering, which is based on using models of the responsibilities assigned to 
agents in a multi-agency system of systems.  The responsibility models serve as 
a basis for identifying the stakeholders that should be considered in establishing 
the requirements and provide a basis for a structured approach, described here, 
for information requirements elicitation. We illustrate this approach using a 
case study drawn from civil emergency management. 
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1   Introduction 
The derivation of requirements for complex systems has been recognized as a major 
problem in industry. The system requirements are a definition of what is expected of 
the system. They inform the system implementation and, in some cases, serve as a 
basis for a contract between a system procurer and a system provider. Historically, 
requirements have been expressed as statements of natural language text that have set 
out the functionality of the system that is expected.  Modern agile methods have 
rejected the notion of requirements as descriptions of functionality and use 
approaches such as user stories to describe what is expected. However, these 
approaches are still primarily concerned with what the system should do. 
Behavioural approaches to requirements engineering are appropriate when 
systems are to be developed from scratch. However, in most organization, new 
systems are now created by integrating functionality from existing systems and 
components.  In such cases, it makes little sense to specify requirements in terms of 
what the system should do – the functionality is already defined in these systems. 
Rather, we argue that it is more appropriate to consider the system requirements from 
an informational perspective – what information should the system provide and who 
needs that information to do their job. 
The derivation of requirements involves extensive discussions and consultations 
with system stakeholders – people who may be system users, their managers or who 
are influenced in some way by the system. An enduring problem in requirements 
engineering has been how to identify the stakeholders to be consulted and how to help 
them articulate their requirements for a system [1].  Requirements engineering 
methods such as Volere [2], say little about this problem – they highlight the 
importance of stakeholder consultation but their only guidance of stakeholder 
identification is to provide a list of stakeholder types. The problems of stakeholder 
identification are exacerbated in situations where the system to be developed spans 
several organizations and these stakeholders are distributed across these 
organizations. 
To address this problem, we have developed the notion of responsibility modeling. 
We explicitly identify the responsibilities of organizational stakeholders in a problem 
setting and draw up a model showing these responsibilities and their assignment to 
agents. This then serves as a basis for both identifying stakeholders and for 
identifying whether or not there are inconsistencies in responsibility perception in the 
different organizations involved. 
Once stakeholders have been identified, we can then enter into discussions with 
them about how they do their job and what information they require to do so.  The 
responsibility model, along with a set of standard questions, is used to facilitate that 
discussion and to help the requirements engineer tease out the interactions between 
stakeholder responsibilities. This then leads to a statement of ‘information 
requirements’ which are then used to inform the system design and implementation. 
In the remainder of the paper, we discuss enterprise systems and how these are 
typically created by composing and configuring existing software systems or 
components. We go on to explain why we think information requirements are the 
most important type of requirement for enterprise systems and follow this with an 
introduction to responsibility modeling. We explain how responsibility models are 
used to derive information requirements and illustrate our approach with a case study 
of an emergency management system.  We conclude with a discussion of related work 
and our thoughts on how this work can be taken forward.  
2   Enterprise systems 
The focus of our work for a number of years has been enterprise systems [3]. This 
term is widely used and is sometimes used synonomously with the term ERP or 
enterprise resource planning systems. Whilst ERP systems are certainly enterprise 
systems, we actually use the term more widely to denote systems that have the 
following characteristics: 
1. They are multifunctional systems in that they deliver different classes of 
functionality. For example, an enterprise system may deliver functionality to 
support both sales and purchasing functions in an organization. 
2. They are often oriented around one or more shared databases. The sharing of 
data means that data is not replicated in the organization and there are 
opportunities for data sharing across the different functions delivered by the 
system.  
3. The different components of the system are self-contained systems so that they 
can operate with or without other components. An enterprise system may 
therefore be considered as a system of systems. 
4. They are used by different classes of stakeholder who have different jobs in the 
organization. Users may have different levels of power and authority in the 
organization and different levels of technical expertise. The user base for these 
systems is therefore heterogeneous and drawn from different levels in the 
organization. 
5. The system will have emergent behavior that cannot be predicted by an 
analysis of the system components. This behavior may be desirable or 
undesirable and is a consequence of the complexity of the relationships 
between the different systems in the enterprise system. 
ERP systems, such as those marketed by SAP and Oracle, are enterprise systems 
where all of the system components are supplied by a single supplier. These ERP 
systems normally have a preferred mode of use and organizations that wish to use an 
ERP system are advised to adapt their processes to this mode of use. Typically, a 
single ERP system will replace a number of separate systems in an organization. 
More generally, enterprise systems may include systems from a number of 
different suppliers. These may communicate through a shared database but may also 
maintain their own databases. Some component systems may be legacy systems – 
older systems based on obsolete technology that have been ‘wrapped’ with e.g. a 
service interface so that they can interact with other systems. Other components may 
be off-the-shelf systems from different manufacturers, specially written systems, etc. 
Enterprise systems may be considered as technical software/hardware systems but 
they are an integral part of wider socio-technical systems in the enterprise. Socio-
technical systems are systems that include people as well as technical elements and 
which are profoundly influenced by organizational policies, processes and culture, as 
well as external regulation. In essence, socio-technical systems are the ways in which 
work gets done in an organization. 
Over the past decade of so, the notion of a virtual organization or virtual enterprise 
[4] has been developed. A virtual organization is temporary entity that is created with 
a particular mission and which involves a number of other organizations. For 
example, a virtual organization may be created to organize a major sporting event 
such as the Olympic Games. This encompasses many different partners, who each 
have their own IT systems. 
Virtual organizations are enterprises in their own right and enterprise systems may 
therefore be created to support their operation. In this case, the component systems 
are distributed across the organizations in the virtual enterprise. These systems have 
all of the above enterprise system characteristics but with additional complications: 
1. The system components in the system of systems are independently owned and 
managed. This means that there is no single authority that can control the 
functionality and development of the enterprise system. 
2. There is no single shared database but rather a confederation of databases from 
the different organizations that are involved in the system. Inevitably there are 
syntactic and semantic incompatibilities between these systems. 
3. The practices and cultures of the different organizations in the virtual 
organization are different. This has the consequence that the overall virtual 
enterprise system is perceived in quite different ways by stakeholders in these 
different organizations.  
In this paper, we will draw on our experience of interacting with a virtual 
organization, which is created to deal with serious civil emergencies such as a 
terrorist attack, regional flooding, or a nuclear incident.   
3   Requirements engineering for enterprise systems 
Requirements engineering (RE) is the process of understanding a system’s 
environment with a view to deriving the requirements for the system – what has to be 
implemented to provide the business functionality that is required. For organizational 
systems, this inevitably means dealing with multiple stakeholders from different parts 
of the organization who have differing needs and priorities. The RE process therefore 
inevitably involves negotiations with and between these stakeholders to arrive at a set 
of requirements that is acceptable to all stakeholders.  This is illustrated in Figure 1. 
The requirements engineering team works with stakeholders to understand their 
requirements for a new or replacement system. These requirements are then 
documented, usually using natural language text, and system models of different 
kinds may be produced. These are then taken back to stakeholders for checking. 
Typically, this is an incremental process and there will be several rounds of the cycle 
completed before a comprehensive set of requirements have been produced.  
Inevitably, there will be conflicts between these requirements as they will represent 
the wishes of stakeholders with diverse needs. Some of these conflicts will be 
resolved by the requirements engineering team but there is always a need for a period 
of negotiation to settle disagreements and to arrive at a set of compromise 
requirements. This negotiation may also involve the implementation team who 
provide information about the costs of implementing the requirements – if 
requirements are too expensive to implement, they may be discarded. 
 
Figure 1. The requirements engineering cycle. 
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Figure 2. Enterprise system requirements engineering 
Most approaches to requirements engineering that have been developed have 
adopted a behavioural perspective – they focus on what the system should ‘do’, in 
terms of delivering functionality to stakeholders of different kinds. However, when 
we are considering enterprise systems, the detailed functionality is largely pre-defined 
by the system components that are used. Instead, we argue that the focus of 
requirements engineering process should be on identifying the information that is 
needed and used by stakeholders, rather than the specific functionality that is used. 
In essence, the requirements engineering process should focus its analysis on the 
information that people need to do their work, the information that they create in the 
course of that work and the information that is shared with other people.  Non-
functional information requirements such as confidentiality requirements for shared 
information, presentation requirements, etc. may also be elicited . 
The basis of this idea is not simply that there is limited scope for extending the 
functionality of the system. It reflects the reality that the introduction of an enterprise 
system normally requires changes to the business processes in the organization. 
People have to change and adapt to use the new system and, by and large, this is not 
really a problem. They can learn new processes and user interfaces. Problems arise, 
however, when people do not have the information they need to do their job, whatever 
the specific process that is used.  
Therefore, a focus on the information needs of stakeholders, as illustrated in Figure 
2, is likely to be the most productive approach for enterprise system requirements 
engineering. 
When we are considering information requirements, however, we need to take into 
account that political and organizational considerations affect both the availability and 
the sharing of information. Stakeholders may deliberately withhold or delay 
information because they see some personal benefit in doing so; they may demand 
that information be presented in certain ways or may insist on their own information 
classification schemes. 
To illustrate what we mean here, consider the situation in hospitals where there is 
perennial (and probably inevitable) tension between the hospital administrators and 
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the senior doctors. Information that is required to support administration is inevitably 
different from clinical information and providing that information often requires 
doctors to do extra work. If doctors are in a strong position within the organization, 
they may simply refuse to provide that information, thus constraining the information 
system. On the other hand, if the power struggle favours the hospital managers, then 
the doctors may comply with the demands to change the way they capture patient 
information. The information requirements depend on the power relationships in the 
organization as well as what people need in order to do their job.  
4   Responsibility and responsibility modelling 
Our work over the past few years has been concerned with the notion of socio-
technical systems engineering, where we are exploring how methods and techniques 
for socio-technical analysis of organizations can be used alongside systems and 
software engineering methods [5]. As part of this work, we have been investigating 
the abstractions that can be used to model complex socio-technical systems. Such 
systems include human and automated components, are significantly influenced by 
organizational policies, culture and politics and often involve participants and systems 
from a number of different organizations. 
One abstraction that we have found to be particularly helpful is the notion of 
‘responsibility’, which can be used to represent the expectations placed on both 
individuals and systems and which is a universal abstraction, used in all types of 
organization. We define a responsibility to be: 
A duty, held by some agent, to achieve, maintain or avoid some given state, 
subject to conformance with organizational, social and cultural norms. 
The key points in this definition are  
• a responsibility is a duty, which implies that the agent holding the 
responsibility is accountable to some authority for their actions,  
• responsibilities may be concerned with avoiding undesirable situations and not 
just with accomplishing some actions  
• in discharging responsibilities, agent behaviour is constrained by laws, 
regulations and social/cultural conventions and expectations. Therefore, the 
effectiveness of an agent in discharging their responsibility is not only judged 
by the outcome but also by the ways in which the agent has discharged that 
responsibility. 
Responsibilities are a particularly helpful abstraction because they are firmly 
rooted in the world of work and are not abstract notions, such as goals, which are 
apparently internalized in individuals. The naturalness of responsibilities means that 
responsibility holders find it easy to communicate with people about their own 
responsibilities and also about the responsibilities of others.   
Of course, it is often the case that there are different interpretations about what a 
responsibility means. Perceived differences in what a responsibility entails are often 
helpful in identifying sources of misunderstanding and, sometimes, requirement 
conflicts.  For example, a responsibility to arrange seminars in a university may be 
interpreted as simply involving finding speakers and gaining their agreement to speak, 
but without any involvement in booking rooms, arranging refreshments, etc. The 
same responsibility may also be considered to be more inclusive so that it involves 
both finding speakers and making all other arrangements for the seminar presentation. 
A responsibility model is a succinct description of the responsibilities that have 
been assigned to agents in one or more organizations.   Our experience in modeling 
with client organizations is that modeling notations have to be simple, easy to explain 
and must avoid technical concepts that are alien to the people in the organization. For 
this reason, we believe that technical modeling notations such as the UML are not 
particularly useful for early-stage requirements engineering. 
 To make the models as simple as possible to explain, we have limited a 
responsibility model to three abstractions: 
1. Responsibilities, as discussed above. Examples of responsibilities, drawn from 
an emergency response system, might be ‘Establish local communications’, 
‘Casualty evacuation’ and ‘Press liaison’.  
2. Agents, which are organizational, human or system entities that may be 
assigned responsibilities. Therefore, an agent may be a named organization 
such as the ambulance service, a person or a role, such as the communication 
coordinator or a software-intensive system, such as an automated despatcher 
for emergency vehicles.  
3. Resources, which are used by agents in discharging their responsibilities. We 
distinguish between two types of resource namely physical resources, which 
are ‘consumed’ in use and information resources, which are not. An example 
of a physical resource is an ambulance – there are a limited number of 
ambulances in an area and once these have all been allocated, the despatcher 
must wait until one has been released. By contrast, an information resource 
such as a geographical information system is not (normally) limited by demand 
– it can be used irrespective of the number of users.  
Figure 3 illustrates a responsibility model that we developed as part of an analysis 
of response to a civil nuclear emergency at a power station by the coast. There are 
consequent responsibilities to inform shipping in the area. In this model: 
1. Responsibilities are shown in round-edged rectangles. 
2. Agent names are enclosed in angle brackets. 
3. Physical resources are shown in square brackets. 
4. The names of information resources are surrounded by vertical bars. 
5. Arrows show the sources and destination of information. 
From this model, you can see that responsibility to check on the safety of shipping 
falls on MRCC Clyde, the maritime rescue coordination center for the Clyde Estuary 
area and it relies on incident information provided by the police and the nuclear 
emergency liaison officer from the NAECC, the National Atomic Emergency 
Coordination Centre. Notice that we don’t decompose this responsibility – how it is 
discharged is up to the organization assigned the responsibility and is of no concern to 
the emergency coordination team. 
Figure 3. An example of a responsibility model 
The broadcasting of safety information relies on a number of information resources 
from various sources (not shown here) and the physical resources of VHF and MF 
radios, which are used to broadcast the information. 
5   Deriving information requirements 
Responsibility models document the responsibilities of the agents involved in a multi-
agency virtual enterprise and so serve as a basis for identifying the sources of  
requirements and the stakeholders who need to be consulted to derive these 
requirements. Our approach to requirements derivation is based on a set of structured 
questions that are put to stakeholders in the system. These questions are based around 
the following topics: 
1.  What information needs to be provided to discharge this responsibility? 
Whilst an apparently simple question, it is not necessarily the case that 
stakeholders from different agencies require the same information. For 
example, a stakeholder in agency A may already have some information 
because it is generated in agency A but this needs to be provided in other 
agencies. So, as well as identifying specific information items, these questions 
identify information that may have to be shared between agencies. 
2.  What channels are used to communicate this information? 
This question identifies the ways in which information is communicated to 
stakeholders. In some organizational systems, this is simple and 
straightforward but in other circumstances such as emergency response, 
 
Check on safety 
of vessels in  
incident area 
Broadcast 
Marine Safety 
Information 
<MRCC Clyde> 
| Navigation warnings | 
| Weather warnings | 
| Subfacts | 
| Gunfacts | 
| Alert Broadcast | | Incident information | 
< Police | NAECC Liaison Officer > 
[ VHF Radio ] [ MF Radio ] 
communication channels can be unreliable. We therefore may identify 
requirements for alternative communication channels that may be used. 
3.  Where does this information come from? 
Again, an apparently simple question that can elicit surprisingly complex 
answers. Our aim is to identify the databases and data sources for the 
information required but different stakeholders may actually acquire 
comparable information from different sources. The question can often reveal 
duplication and overlap in the information maintained by organizations. 
4.  What information is generated and recorded in the discharge of this 
responsibility and why? 
This question tries to tease out what information is created by an agent who 
holds and responsibility and the rationale for the information creation. This 
helps us identify requirements for storing that information and for maintaining 
meta-data for that information (who created, when created, etc. 
5.  What channels are used to communicate this recorded information? 
As above, we are interested in communication problems that may arise and 
backup requirements. 
6.  What are the consequences if the information required is unavailable, 
inaccurate, incomplete, late, early?  
Problems of information availability are common in multi-organizational 
systems Here we are specifically interested in trying to derive ‘coping’ 
requirements which allows the system to continue in effective operation when 
things go wrong. We have developed an approach based on HAZOPs [7], 
which we have discussed in some detail in a separate paper [8]. 
These questions are not formulaic – they are interpreted by the requirements 
engineering depending on local circumstances and the people being interviewed. 
Their purpose is to structure the discussion between a requirements engineer and 
system stakeholders. Typically, they lead to further questions and discussion about 
how stakeholders discharge their responsibilities. We expect the requirements 
engineer to deliver the results of that discussion in a form that is appropriate for the 
type of system being developed. This could be natural language requirements, 
diagrams or tables or even user stories. 
6   Case study – emergency coordination system  
To illustrate the derivation of requirements from responsibilities, we use an example 
of a system that helps coordinate the responses of the different agencies that are 
involved in dealing with civil emergencies. In the UK (and we understand elsewhere), 
the emergency services each have their own command and control systems and they 
do not think that it is appropriate to integrate these into a single system for all of the 
emergency services.  Systems from other agencies may also be required to support 
emergency coordination. These might include systems from government agencies, 
such as the environment agency for flood management, and systems from local and 
regional government that maintain information about the local area. 
Figure 4. Responsibility model of evacuation coordination 
Therefore, the coordination system is primarily an information management 
system that draws information from other systems and databases. It serves a variety of 
different stakeholders - emergency service staff working at the site of the emergency, 
emergency service coordination and planning officers, press officers, local 
government officers, and so on.  
We will focus in this case study on the information requirements for the 
evacuation of premises in an area that is threatened by flooding.  The information here 
is drawn from an analysis of a flooding emergency in the north-west of England in 
2005.   
Figure 4 shows the responsibility model for area evacuation.  Some terminology 
here may need to be explained: 
1. Silver command is the command centre that is set up to deal with the 
emergency and is responsible for strategic decision making. It is located in a 
pre-allocated, networked control room. Officers from the different services are 
involved in Silver Command.  It is generally located away from the source of 
the emergency and communicates by radio and telephone with the on-site 
command centre (Bronze Command).  
2. In England, there are two levels of local government at the district level 
(District Council) and at the regional level (County Council).  The allocation 
of functions to District and County councils is historical. 
Given situation information such as the current and predicted level of local rivers 
and weather forecasts, Silver Command carries out a risk analysis and on the basis of 
that analysis may decide that an area should be evacuated (Initiate Evacuation). This 
is a legal decision that results in the handover of certain powers to the emergency 
services, such as the right to remove people from their homes, and this must be agreed 
by all of the services. Evacuation then proceeds (the dashed arrow in Figure 4 means 
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that these responsibilities are discharged in sequence). The police are responsible for 
coordination and the maintenance of security and the fire service are responsible for 
search and rescue operations if these are required. The district council arranges 
transport for evacuees but the county council is responsible for setting up safe places 
(reception centres) to which the evacuees are taken. 
Notice that the responsibility to collect information about evacuees has no agent 
associated with it. This is an omission in the emergency plan that we discovered when 
we drew up the responsibility model. This highlights one of the key benefits of 
responsibility modeling – it serves to expose responsibility vulnerabilities that may 
lead to a failure to discharge the responsibility.   
Figure 4 also illustrates another characteristic of responsibility models – they may 
be incomplete. In this case, we do not show any resources that may be used in the 
discharge of a responsibility. This means that we do not need to clutter a diagram with 
unnecessary information before using that diagram and that we can proceed with 
modeling even when information is incomplete. 
By asking the questions identified above, we can discover the information that is 
required and produced as part of evacuation coordination. This is presented in a 
tabular form in Tables 1 and 2.  Table 1 documents the information that is required to 
discharge the responsibility. Table 2 documents the information generated.  
Information required Source Communication channel 
Area map County council Radio data link to printers 
in local command centre 
Priority premises list District Council Radio data link to printers 
in local command centre 
Assembly points list District Council Radio data link to printers 
in local command centre 
Evacuated premises Police, Fire Service Radio from Silver 
Command 
Unsafe routes Police Radio from Silver 
Command 
Threat information Environment agency Radio from Silver 
Command 
Transport capacity and 
availability 
District Council Radio from Silver 
Command 
Police and other 
emergency service 
availability 
Police, other services Radio from Silver 
Command 
Table 1. Information used in the discharge of the evacuation responsibility 
The priority premises list is a list of premises, such as schools and care homes, 
where the occupants cannot be expected to evacuate themselves. The evacuation 
involves local residents going to local assembly points from which they are 
transported to a place of safety. Unsafe routes are those routes that must be closed off 
by the emergency services because they are already flooded or in imminent danger of 
flooding.  
We have found that it is important to maintain information about the 
communication channels that are used. Communications are often a problem in 
emergency management so it is important to check that backup channels are available. 
In addition, the system being developed automatically generates and sends messages 
and so it is important to have information about how these should be transmitted. 
 
 
Information created/recorded Channels 
Information about evacuated premises, 
evacuation time and units responsible for 
evacuation 
Radio or verbal report from ground units 
to local Bronze Command. Email or fax 
to Silver Command if available, 
otherwise radio. 
Information about unchecked premises Radio or verbal report from ground units 
to local Bronze Command. Email or fax 
to Silver Command if available, 
otherwise radio 
Information about unsafe routes Radio or verbal report from ground units 
to local Bronze Command. Email or fax 
to Silver Command if available, 
otherwise radio 
Table 2. Information recorded in the discharge of the evacuation responsibility 
A critical part of the questioning process is the analysis of the consequences if 
information is not available as expected. We assess these consequences when the 
information required is unavailable, inaccurate, incomplete, delivered late or early? 
For example, consider the information relating to the list of priority premises to be 
evacuated: 
1. Information unavailable. A manual premises check is required to see if there 
are vulnerable people who need help with evacuation. Evacuation delayed and 
additional effort required. 
2. Information inaccurate. Again, a manual premises check may be required. 
There may be delay in evacuating vulnerable people and vulnerable people 
may not left behind. 
3. Information incomplete. Delay in evacuation. 
4. Information late. Information has to be communicated to units in the field by 
radio rather than to local coordination centre.  This is time consuming and less 
reliable than written communications with Bronze Command. 
5. Information early. No consequence. 
The information on ‘information hazards’ may then be used as a basis for defining 
requirements for mitigation strategies that lessen the consequences of subsequent 
failure. We see examples of these in the requirements shown in the following section. 
6.1   System requirements 
After the information about the information used by and generated by stakeholders 
has been collected, it is then the responsibility of the requirements engineer to 
generate system requirements in an appropriate form. If a formal requirements 
document is to be produced, this is likely to be a mix of natural language 
requirements and tables; if the requirements are expressed less formally, then tables 
such as Table 1 and Table 2, along with relevant commentary may be all that is 
required.  
We show a subset of natural language requirements for an emergency response 
coordination system (ERCS) along with the rationale for these requirements below. 
These have been derived from the information documented in Tables 1 and 2. 	  
1. The ERCS shall be able to import information from the District Council 
planning system, the Police emergency system and the Fire Service emergency 
system. (Different types of information needs to be shared and this allows for 
information transfer between agencies). 
2. All information to be imported shall be available in either XML format or in 
PDF. (This is intended to minimize the problems of importing information from 
different databases). 
3.  The ERCS shall maintain its own list of priority premises to be evacuated for 
each town in the local area. This shall be updated by the local council when the 
coordination centre is established from the council’s list. (This is a critical 
asset for evacuation. The premises list is normally maintained by the local 
government authority but may not be immediately available outside of normal 
working hours; While an older list may be out of date, it is better than 
nothing). 
4.  The ERCS shall maintain a list of premises evacuated along with the time of 
evacuation and the units involved in the evacuation. (This allows units 
involved in the evacuation to be coordinated and maintains an audit trail of 
who did what and when). 
5. The ERCS shall notify all liaison officers of new information about the threat 
situation as it becomes available. (Different services may respond differently 
to changes in the threat situation e.g. local government staff may withdraw 
from a situation because they are not equipped to deal with search and rescue). 
6. Alerts that threat information has changed should be displayed on all user 
screens and should be sent by SMS to all liaison officers (Threat information is 
critical and should be sent on multiple channels. SMS can reach officers when 
they are not at their desk). 
7. ERCS operators should be able to update the Area Map with information about 
unsafe routes, without the need to access the source data for that map (This 
allows maps to be distributed to emergency services but does not require 
operators to have access to the Council GIS). 
8. If information on evacuated premises is not available, the ERCS shall request 
the information from the Police liaison officer and send an SMS alert that this 
information has been requested. (The Police are responsible for collecting this 
information and the Police liaison officer is then responsible for initiating a 
manual premises check if this is required). 
9. The ERCS shall maintain a list of all unchecked premises and shall 
automatically update this when information on evacuated premises is updated. 
(If premises have been evacuated, they are no longer unchecked. This partially 
mitigates problems due to delays in updating the unchecked premises list). 
10.  Transcripts of all incoming radio communications shall be maintained in the 
ERCS along with the time of these communications and the identifier of the 
source of the message (This is required for auditing purposes if problems are 
subsequently reported). 
7   Related work 
The notion of using models of responsibility to support the requirements engineering 
process was first suggested by Dobson and Strens [8]. This was part of the ORDIT 
project [9, 10], which focused on organizational issues in software engineering. The 
work on requirements here was mostly concerned with what they termed 
‘organizational requirements’ – requirements that are derived from organizational 
factors such as the power and authority relationships between people and departments 
in an organization. 
Working in conjunction with Sommerville and others [11, 12], Dobson continued 
the work on responsibility models and documented this in a series of papers, which 
were published in a book that he co-edited with Dewsbury [13]. These were the basis 
for our own work on responsibility modeling where we have been concerned with 
responsibilities and system dependability and models of responsibility in virtual 
organizations [14, 15, 16] .  
Responsibilities are an example of an abstraction that is clearly located in the 
world of system stakeholders rather than a technical abstraction such as an object or 
system function. The most closely related alternative abstraction to responsibility that 
has been proposed is the notion of a goal. A goal is seen as something that an agent is 
trying to achieve and goal-based approaches to requirements engineering such as i* 
and KAOS are intended to expose high level dependencies between the goals 
associated with agents in a given system [17, 18, 19]. 
Sub-goals may be derived from higher level objectives and assigned to agents for 
completion. Goals are achieved through the achievement of some or all sub- goals. 
Relationships between sub-goals express the possible ways in which the super-goal 
may be achieved. Analysis of such models can examine, for example, whether a 
super-goal may fail due to the failure of a single sub-goal (brittleness), or whether a 
particular agent has been overloaded with too many 
goals to achieve. 
We argue that the key benefit of using responsibilities rather than goals comes 
from the naturalness of the abstraction. Goals, in the sense of something that is to be 
achieved, have 3 main problems: 
1. The goals of individuals are usually internalised and people find these very 
difficult to articulate. This is particularly true in professional roles where the 
work to be done is left to the discretion of the individual. 
2. Many, perhaps most organizations, do not have a coherent set of organizational 
goals and, where they do, it cannot be assumed that goals set by management 
are actually shared by the people in the organization.  
3. The goals of individuals in an organization may be focused on personal 
advancement and this may, in fact, conflict with organizational goals. 
In a review of research on goal-oriented approaches, Lapouchnian [20] rightly 
states “Identifying goals is not an easy task”. He has found, in practice, that goals are 
normally derived from other information that is discovered from stakeholders rather 
than articulated directly from them.  
8   Conclusions  
The modeling approach proposed here, based on the responsibilities that have been 
assigned to agents in an enterprise, has been found to be useful in supporting the 
elicitation of ‘information requirements’. We argue that for enterprise systems, which 
are systems of systems it is more appropriate to focus on the information required and 
created by system stakeholders rather than the behavioural characteristics of a system. 
The key benefits of using responsibilities and responsibility models in this context 
are: 
1.  Naturalness: can stakeholders without experience of requirements engineering 
relate to the approach? The notion of responsibility and responsible behaviour 
is widely used in everyday discourse so people can readily discuss their 
responsibilities in some situation. The questions used to discover information 
requirements relate directly to the stakeholder's job and are therefore easy to 
understand. 
2. Scalability: Can the approach be used with real rather than simple example 
systems? The problem with many RE methods is that they have been 
developed using relatively simple systems and when scaled up, unmanageable 
volumes of information are created. Our development has always relied on real 
system examples and we are confident that our approach scales – for example, 
we have developed responsibility models of 300-page emergency plans.   
3. Complementarity: can the approach be used alongside other requirements 
engineering methods? Responsibility models offer a different perspective from 
the behavioural perspective used in other methods so there are no problems in 
practice in using these together. 
There are practical and methodological problems in attempting to compare 
requirements engineering methods, which mean quantitative comparative evaluation 
is unreliable. Furthermore, comparison of methods is not the same as comparison of 
outcomes. Method A may be better than method B at eliciting requirements but until a 
system has been implemented and put into use, we really don’t know if these 
requirements meet the needs of the system stakeholders.  
Therefore, we cannot and do not claim here that the use of responsibility models 
in the RE process necessarily leads to the discovery of ‘better’ requirements. All we 
can say is that responsibilities are a good way of stimulating requirements discussions 
and this, we believe, increases the chances that the requirements are likely to be 
appropriate. 
Responsibility models provide a technology-independent perspective on complex 
systems of systems, where the components are already in existence. We have 
explored how these models may also be used in the systems design phase [21]. In this 
work, we have found the need to enhance these models with the notion of a capability 
– a set of competences and resources – that defines the responsibilities that could be 
assigned to a system.  This work is still at an early stage but it points the way to how 
responsibilities and capabilities could be used to support system of systems design. 
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